Passengers,consumers, and travellers: The rise of passenger rights in EC transport law and its repercussions for Community consumer law and policy

EC transport law is set to be complemented by a series of Regulations giving rights to passengers for almost every mode of transport. These Regulations not only give transport law a distinct consumer dimension but also add new elements to European private law. This paper attempts to provide a horizontal, or intermodal, survey of these Regulations, adopted and proposed. It is argued that passenger law, although originating separately and remaining a sector distinct from other fields of law, has become part of a wider, three-stranded notion of European consumer policy deserving due attention as the force most dynamically expanding the area of Community law of contracts and of torts. The paper will point to the elements of consumer contract law and the law on travel and tourism related to passenger transport and elaborate on the basics for finding a common notion of the key terms like “passenger” and “damage” for Community law. It concludes with some points for further reflection.

城市污水处理行业的激励性价格管制

本文在借鉴雪理佛和巴杰夫特提出的区域间比较竞争模型基础上,引入利润率和质量系数,构建了两阶段污水处理区域间比较竞争定价模型,主要运用数据包络分析方法确定标杆企业,以促进污水处理企业之间的比较竞争。并以浙江省污水处理行业为例,运用聚类分析方法对污水处理企业的异质性进行区分与分类,对典型的污水处理企业进行价格测算,为污水处理行业实行激励性价格管制提供理论依据。     

民间借贷政策规制的社会福利效应：一个分析框架

本文通过构建一个民间借贷规制模型来分析需求弹性和行政执法成本对规制效率的影响。模型表明：在民间借贷缺乏需求弹性时,由于高昂的禁令规制成本,对政府而言更为合适的手段是将民间借贷采取合法化、并加以征税的规制政策。在我国,除了通过“民间借贷服务中心”等机构创新来实现民间金融规范化以外,更主要地是打破金融机构市场准入高度管控的体制,允许民间资本进入金融业,使民间金融机构合法化。     

Impacts of land-cover change on the water flow regulation ecosystem service: Invasive alien plants,fire and their policy implications

Land and water resource issues typically fall under separate governance systems. For example, agricultural policy regulates land-cover change while water departments regulate water quality. However, land-use changes can directly affect water resources. Water flow regulation is a key service which is affected by changes in land-cover but its dynamics are poorly understood by most policy makers and land management organisations. We simulated and quantified the effects of plant invasions on land-cover, hydrological soil characteristics and catchment responsiveness on flow regulation using a hydrological model. The case study was located in the indigenous fynbos shrublands in South Africa. Fynbos requires fire to regenerate, has moderate biomass, occurs mostly in areas with a potential to erode and is prone to invasion by woody plant species, particularly trees. Invasions can affect flow regulation by changing community structure and function and increasing fuel loads. The greater fuel load increases fire intensity and severity which, in turn, changes the hydrological responses of catchments. Few studies have assessed the effects of invasion on hydrological responses but studies on plantations have recorded significant increases in soil water repellence following fire, resulting in increased overland flow similar to impacts of fires in invaded areas. Simulation of clear-felling of pines and different degrees of water repellency increased both the responsiveness of the catchment to rainfall and extreme rainfall events. The simulated fire effects were consistent with other studies of hydrological responses to fire. Our study indicates that invasions of pines and acacias in the study area could substantially increase the risk of flood damage even from moderate rainfall events, and highlights the importance of maintaining flow regulation capacity. New policy approaches are required which take account of the linkages and interactions between land-use choices, water resources and ecosystem services, and address them when considering governance arrangements.     

英国金融市场基础设施监管状况及未来发展

文章剖析了英国金融市场基础设施（主要包括支付系统、中央对手方和证券结算系统）的监管框架，总结了监管工作在信用风险和流动性风险、恢复与处置和操作风险管理等方面取得的主要进展，阐述了其在国内、国际监管合作方面的监管权力运用，梳理了下一步的发展方向和酝酿的主要变革。     

An application of data envelopment analysis to evaluate the efficiency level of the operational cost of Brazilian electricity distribution utilities

This paper shows efficiency indices for 60 Brazilian electricity distribution utilities. The efficiency scores are gauged by three DEA models. For both models, these quantities are evaluated under different contexts. One treats with respect to the regulator perspective. The others examine an alternative approach based on cluster analysis and restrictions on factor weights. It is worth pointing out that these developments can reduce the information asymmetry and improve the regulator's skill to compare the performance of the utilities, a fundamental in incentive regulation schemes.     

The impact of the French Tobin tax

We analyze the impact of the introduction of the French Tobin tax on the turnover and measures of the liquidity and volatility of the affected stocks with nonparametric tests on individual stocks, difference-in-difference tests and other robustness checks controlling for simultaneous month-of-the-year and size effects. Our findings indicate that the tax produces a significant reduction in turnover and volatility (measured in terms of stock price volatility and the high–low price range) and inconclusive effects on liquidity when the latter is evaluated under the two dimensions of the estimated bid–ask spread and the Amihud (2002) price impact ratio.     

Too-Big-To-Fail: Why Megabanks Have Not Become Smaller Since the Global Financial Crisis?

ABSTRACT

More than ten years after the global financial crisis, what has happened to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) banks whose reckless behavior was among its preconditions, but which received public support and guarantees in the midst of that crisis? Insofar as this too-big-to-fail status helped create the crisis and then imposed costs on the rest of society, we would expect these banks to have shrunk. We investigate the evolution of 31 global-TBTF banks and find that their overall size has hardly recorded any substantial change. However, there is no sense of urgency in the flourishing post-crisis literature on TBTF banks about the need to contain their size; the prevalent view therein is that if properly regulated, the risks that arise from a financial system dominated by TBTF banks are manageable. This view rests on the same overly narrow theoretical underpinnings whose flaws were exposed in the crisis. We argue that too-big-to-fail banking is embedded in a set of self-reinforcing policies—consolidation, balance-sheet support through quantitative easing, favorable regulations, bank lobbying, and geo-economic and geo-political considerations—which explain why these banks have not shrunk and why they remain a threat to financial stability, well after the lessons of the crisis should have been learned.     

Stabilizing Endogenous Instability: Proposals for An Institutionalist Reform of Financial Regulation

A major and persistent question behind economic theories and related policies is whether the market can self-regulate without any restrictive exogenous intervention or whether regular and binding public regulation is necessary for ensuring the reproduction of the economic system in a sustainable way over time. This article considers this question with regard to the working of financial markets in a liberalized environment. Drawing upon an institutionalist stance, the article shows why the operation of a financialized capitalist economy usually leads to systemic imbalances and crises. The article then suggests an alternative framework for a consistent financial regulation that could prevent market actors from developing short-sighted strategies and gambling on macro stability.     

The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking

We examine whether stress tests distort banks' risk‐taking decisions. We study a model in which a regulator may choose to rescue banks in the event of concurrent bank failures. Our analysis reveals a novel coordination role of stress tests. Disclosure of stress‐test results informs banks of the failure likelihood of other banks, which can reduce welfare by facilitating banks' coordination in risk‐taking. However, conducting stress tests also enables the regulator to more effectively intervene banks, coordinating them preemptively into taking lower risks. We find that, if the regulator has a strong incentive to bail out, stress tests improve welfare, whereas if the regulator's incentive to bail out is weak, stress tests impair welfare.